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Motor vehicles provide a vital means of transporting people
and goods in this country. Unfortunately, tragic costs resulting
from accidents accompany motor vehicular transportation. More
Americans have died on United States highways this year alone
than on the battlefields of Southeast Asia during this entire dec-
ade. The billions of vehicle miles driven annually in this nation
result in over 50,000 deaths, hundreds of thousands of personal
injuries, and untold sums of property damage and emotional an-
guish caused by traffic accidents. Drunken driving is of special
concern because of the evidence that the risk of accident in-
volvement increases dramatically as blood-alcohol level concen-
tration increases. Several studies suggest that up to seventy-five
percent of fatally injured drivers in the United States have blood
alcohol concentrations above 0.05%, while up to fifty percent of
fatally injured drivers have blood alcohol concentrations of 0-15%
or more.'
Implied consent laws have become popular with legislators who
have begun to recognize the special hazards posed by the drinking
driver and the need to deter such behavior. Under these laws,
operation of a motor vehicle on the highway constitutes implied
consent to take, under certain conditions, chemical tests to deter-
mine the blood alcohol content of an operator. The theory under-
lying such a law is, simply, that the normal enforcement proce-
dures may be more effectively implemented if chemical evidence
* A.B. 1966, Amherst College; J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.
See R. BORKENSTEIN, THE ROLE OF THE DRINKING DRIVER IN TRAFFIc ACCIDENTS
(1964). The average 150 pound man must drink 7 ounces of 80 proof whiskey in one
hour to reach a blood alcohol level of 0.15%.
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of blood alcohol levels can be obtained. The sanction for failure
to comply with the proferred tests is usually revocation of the
driver's license for a period of time. In 1967, Michigan enacted
such an implied consent law. 2 This act added two important
provisions to the existing state law. First, presumptions from
chemical test results for driving under the influence and driving
while impaired by intoxicants were established. Second, any oper-
ator arrested for intoxication or impairment is deemed to have
impliedly given his consent to take such tests.3 These two provi-
sions are designed to provide police and prosecutor with a meth-
od to more readily obtain objective evidence pertinent to a trial
for intoxication or impairment. At the same time, this act at-
tempts to protect the individual's right to fair and civilized treat-
ment by the law enforcement and orosecuting authorities.
To illustrate the operation of the statute, consider the following
hypothetical situation. Drunk N. Driver, after drinking for a few
hours at the local tavern, leaves the parking lot with a squeal of
his tires, unfortunately in the presence of Patrolman Law. Ob-
serving this behavior, Patrolman Law stops Driver and, smelling
liquor on his breath, arrests Driver for driving while intoxicated.
Law informs Driver that by operating a motor vehicle on the
highways of Michigan, he has impliedly consented to tests of his
bodily substances. Law also informs Driver of various rights
which he has and of the consequence of refusing to submit to a
test, that is, revocation of his license. This warning may occur at
the scene of the arrest, during the ride to the testing site, or at the
police station.
If Driver submits to the breath test offered by Patrolman Law
and administered by Sergeant Tester, the results will be recorded
by Tester from the face of the breath testing machine. If the result
is less than the statutory presumptive level for driving while
intoxicated or under the influence, Driver may then be released.
If the test result is above the statutory presumptive level, Driver
will be bound over for trial.
At the trial, Driver will describe his actions and his perplexity
at being arrested. Law will describe the behavior he observed
which led to the arrest and Driver's general demeanor. Tester will
2 [1967] Mich. Pub. Act No. 253.
3 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625, 257.625a-g (1967).
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describe the theory behind the breath test, the procedure used in
taking the test, and the validity of the results as they relate to the
presumption at the time of the alleged illegal operation. Direct
and cross-examination will require Law and Tester to remain
patiently in the courtroom and on the witness stand for long
periods of time as prosecution and defense spar over the legality
of the procedures. If Driver is convicted, he will lose his license
and face other criminal penalties.
If Driver refuses to take any test, the drunken driving charges
may be dropped entirely, lowered to a different charge or be
pressed without chemical test evidence. On Driver's refusal, Law
shall forward a sworn report to the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles stating that he had reasonable grounds to believe that
Driver had been driving while under the influence or while im-
paired and that Driver had refused to submit to a test upon
request. The Department, upon receipt of Law's sworn state-
ment, notifies Driver that, if he does not request a hearing within
fourteen days of such notice, the Secretary of State shall suspend
his license for a period of from ninety days to two years. An
immediate appeal by Driver will lead to a hearing before the
License Appeal Board. Meanwhile, a trial for drunken driving
may be proceeding to a verdict without the benefit of chemical
tests.
At the License Appeal Board's hearing, local prosecutors and
policemen, as well as representatives from the Secretary of
State's office, will rule summarily on Driver's complex arguments.
Driver may, at his option, appeal the License Appeal Board's
decision to the Circuit Court for a de novo review of the issues
considered by the Board. If Driver loses his appeal to the Circuit
Court, he may then appeal through the state's appellate courts.
Two years later, Driver's appeal may reach the state supreme
court. If the revocation of license for refusal to submit to a test is
affirmed, Driver may then petition for a hardship license which
will grant him limited driving privileges.
The events described above depict a relatively simple example
of the implied consent law's operation. This article examines how
the law operates, the rights and duties of the state and of the
individual, how problems of interpretation should be resolved
and whether the present law most effectively balances state and
individual interests. The article concludes with suggestions for
December 19691
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reform of the law and a reconsideration of ways to control the
drinking driver.
II. Procedural Safeguards under the Implied Consent Law:
A Balancing of Interests
The Michigan Legislature has attempted to protect the arrested
motorist from the administration of a test or tests which might be
objectionable to a majority in the community:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
act, a person requested to take this test shall
be advised that he has the option to demand
that only a breath test shall be given, in
which case his refusal to submit to any other
test shall not constitute a refusal for sections
625d and 625f [which provide procedures for
the revocation and review of the driver's li-
cense for refusal to submit to chemical tests].
[Emphasis added]. 4
This legislative command requires that all police agencies make
available a breath test to every person to be tested as a pre-
requisite to lawfully obtaining evidence of the driver's blood alco-
hol content. In contrast to the likely public objection to giving
samples of blood, urine, or saliva, the relative ease of exhaling a
deep breath into a sterilized mouthpiece makes such a command
appear reasonable.
The act utilizes Michigan's system of review of the Secretary
of State's revocation actions. Under section 625f(1), the Secre-
tary must suspend or revoke, for at least ninety days, the license
of a person arrested for intoxication or impairment who refuses to
submit to chemical tests and does not request a hearing within
fourteen days after notice of the impending revocation has been
sent to him.5 Upon receiving such notification, the person may
4 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 251.625a(6) (1967).
5 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625d,e,f (1967), as amended, Mich. Pub. Act No. 335
(1968).
Sec. 625d. A person under arrest shall be advised of
his right to refuse to submit to chemical tests; and if he
refuses the request of a law enforcement officer to submit
to chemical tests, no test shall be given. A sworn report
shall be forwarded to the department by the law enforce-
ment officer stating that he had reasonable grounds to
believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle
[Vol. 3:1
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request a hearing before the License Appeal Board (hereafter
Board) in the county of arrest, the hearing to be held within thirty
days of such request. 6 The Board consists of a representative of
the office of the Secretary of State, of the office of the Attorney
General (usually a member of the local prosecuting attorney's
office), and of the local police agency where the arrest occurred.
Two members constitute a quorum for action and the requisite
decision-making authority. The Board has the power to subpoena
witnesses, to hear sworn testimony, and to punish witnesses for
contempt. 7 The Board is limited to the consideration of four
issues in its review of a license revocation for refusal to submit to
chemical tests. 8 The Secretary of St-te may suspend, revoke, or
on the public highways of the state while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or that he had been driv-
ing a vehicle while his ability to operate a vehicle had
been impaired due to the consumption of intoxicating
liquor and that the person had refused to submit to the
test upon the request of the law enforcement officer and
had been advised of the consequences of such refusal.
The form of the report shall be prescribed and furnished
by the Department of State.
Sec. 625e. Upon receipt of the sworn statement, the
department shall immediately notify the person in writ-
ing, mailed to his last known address, that such sworn
statement has been received and that within 14 days of
the date of the notice he may request a hearing as pro-
vided in section 322.
Sec. 625f. (1) If the person does not request a hearing
within 14 days of the date of such notice, the secretary of
state shall suspend or revoke such person's operator's or
chauffeur's license or permit to drive, or any nonresident
operating privilege, for a period of not less than 90 days
nor more than 2 years. If the person is a resident without
a license or permit to operate a vehicle in this state, the
secretary shall deny to that person the issuance of a
license or permit for a period of not less than 3 months
nor more than 2 years.
6 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625f(2) (1967). as amended, Mich. Pub. Act No. 355 (1968).
(2) If a hearing is requested, the department shall hold
such hearing within 30 days of receipt of such request in
the same manner and under the same conditions as pro-
vided in section 322. The hearing shall be conducted in
the county where the arrest was made. At least 10 days
notice of the hearing shall be mailed to the person re-
questing the hearing, to the law enforcement officer who
filed the sworn report and to the prosecuting attorney of
the county where the arrest was made.
7 1d.; MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 257.322 (1967).
8 MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625f(2)(a)-(d) (1967). Such hearing shall cover only the
following issues:
(a) Whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that the person had been driving a
Prospectus [Vol. 3:1
deny issuance of a license of the driver for a period not less than
ninety days nor more than two years, depending on the resolution
of these four issues at the Board hearing. 9 A person dissatisfied
with the Board's decision may file a petition for review of the
suspension or revocation decision in the Circuit Court of the
county in which the arrest was made. 10 The Circuit Court must
hear the case de novo.11 In the past, the Circuit Courts have often
modified the orders of the Secretary of State, allowing petitioners
to regain some driving privileges. In recognition of this fact, the
legislature amended the statute to limit the Circuit Court's "re-
view" to the same four issues considered by the Board, while
explicitly authorizing the restoration of only very limited driving
privileges in hardship cases.'
2
The act establishes presumptions in any criminal prosecution
motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while
under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or while his
ability to operate a vehicle had been impaired due to the
consumption of intoxicating liquor.
(b) Whether the person was placed under arrest for driv-
ing a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while
under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or while his
ability to operate a vehicle had been impaired due to the
consumption of intoxicating liquor.
(c) Whether the person reasonably refused to submit to
the test upon the request of the officer.
(d) Whether the person was advised of his rights as set
forth in sections 625a, 625c and 625d.
MicH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625f(3) (1967).
After the hearing, the secretary may suspend, revoke
or deny issuance of a license or driving permit or any
nonresident operating privilege of the person involved
for a period of not less than 90 days nor more than 2
years. If the person involved is a resident without a
license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in this state,
the secretary may deny to that person the issuance of a
license or permit for a period of not less than 3 months
nor more than 24 months.
1 0 id.
The person involved may file a petition in the ***
circuit court of the county in which the arrest was made
to review the suspension, revocation or denial in the
same manner and under the same conditions as provided
in section 323. All hearings in circuit court shall be de




2 1d., as amended, Mich. Pub. Act. No. 335 (1967).
Implied Consent
for intoxication or impairment based upon the amount of alcohol
contained in the blood, as determined by chemical tests. If, at the
time of the alleged violation, the percentage, by weight, of alcohol
in the defendant's blood was 0.05% or less, the presumption is
that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol. If the
percentage is more than 0.05% but less than 0.10%, no presump-
tion is made. If the percentage is 0.10% or more, the presumption
is that the defendant was guilty of impairment. If the percentage
is 0.15% or more, the presumption is that the defendant was
guilty of intoxication.'
3
Although individuals react differently to the same blood alcohol
levels, research indicates that an individual's functional ability is
severely impaired at a level of 0.08% and that the likelihood of
accident involvement increases dramatically as blood alcohol lev-
els rise above 0.04%.14 The Michigan law, therefore, may provide
different penalties for similar behavior. If the blood alcohol con-
centration is below 0.10%, the only likely "penalty" is the contact
with police and the nuisance of submitting to a breath test. An
impairment conviction, based upon a blood alcohol level of 0.10%
or more, may result in a $100 fine, ninety days in jail, and the
13 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625a(l)(a)-(d) (1967).
(a) If there was at that time 0.05% or less by weight of
alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed
that the defendant was not under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor.
(b) If there was at that time in excess of 0.05% but less
than 0.10% by weight of alcohol in the defendant's
blood, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption
that the defendant was or was not under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered with
other competent evidence in determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.
(c) If there was at the time 0.10% or more by weight of
alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed
that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle
was impaired within the provisions of section 625b of
this act due to the consumption of intoxicating liquor.
(d) If there was at that time 0.15% or more by weight of
alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed
that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
14 Cramton, The Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A.J. 995 (1968); McFarland,
Alcohol and Highway Accidents-A Summary of Present Knowledge, TRAFFIC Di-
GEST AND REV. (May 1968); BORKENSTEIN, supra note I.
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addition of points to the person's driving record. 15 An in-
toxication conviction, based upon a blood alcohol level of 0.15%
or more, may result in the same penalties; but, in addition, the
person must pay a $50 fine and surrender his driver's license. 16
Consent to take tests is deemed implied only if the person is
arrested for intoxication or impairment. 17 The tests are to be
administered only at the request of an officer having reasonable
grounds to believe the person was driving under the influence of
alcohol on the public highways.' If the arrested driver is afflicted
15 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625b(b) (1967).
(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this section
may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than
90 days or fined not more than $100.00, or both, togeth-
er with costs of the prosecution. On a second and sub-
sequent conviction under this section or a local ordi-
nance substantially corresponding thereto, he may be
imprisoned for not more than 1 year or fined not to
exceed $1,000.00, or both. The division of driver and
vehicle services, within 10 days after the receipt of a
properly prepared abstract, shall record 4 points for each
conviction under this section.
16 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625(c), (e) (1967).
(c) Penalty. Any person who is convicted of a violation
of paragraph (a) or (b) of this section shall be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail or Detroit house of
correction for not more than 90 days or by a fine of not
less than $50.00 nor more than $ 100.00 or both such fine
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, together
with costs of the prosecution.
Section (e) provides for the surrender of operator's or chauffeur's license by
persons found guilty of violating this act or a substantially similar local ordinance.
Such differences in sanctions permit the researcher to attempt to determine wheth-
er the drinking-driving behavior, induced by different levels of blood alcohol content,
is essentially the same and includes the same type of persons. By studying the
subsequent drinking-driving behavior of such persons, the researcher may be able to
determine which set of sanctions is most effective in deterring future drinking-driving
behavior and whether lower presumptive levels for drunk-driving offenses should be
adopted.
17 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625c(l)(a) (1967).
Sec. 625c. (I) A person who operates a vehicle upon
the public highways of this state is deemed to have given
consent to chemical tests of his blood, breath, urine or
other bodily substances for the purpose of determining
the alcoholic content of his blood if:
(a) He is arrested for driving a vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, or while his ability to
operate a vehicle has been impaired due to the con-
sumption of intoxicating liquor ....
18 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625c(2) (1967).
(2) The tests shall be administered at the request of a
law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to
December 1969] Implied Consent
with hemophilia, diabetes, or any condition requiring the use of an
anticoagulant, he shall not be deemed to have given his consent to
the withdrawal of blood.' 9
The statute balances the State's power, as exercised by the
police and prosecutor, to request chemical tests to aid in in-
toxication and impairment prosecutions with various rights of the
individual. The statute's underlying impetus is the difficulty of
obtaining proof, other than chemical, to convict an accused of
such a "folk-crime" as drunken driving before a sympathetic jury.
Chemical evidence, based on presumptions and implemented by
an implied consent law, enables the police and prosecution to
convict a person by objective evidence rather than forcing them
to rely on subjective observations and conflicting attitudes toward
the drinking driver.
The act provides several additional safeguards for the arrested
driver. The results of any tests taken must be made available to
the person or his attorney by the prosecution upon written
request.20 Samples of urine, breath, and saliva shall be taken in a
reasonable manner, and only a duly licensed physician, acting in a
medical environment at the request of a police officer, can over-
believe the person was driving a vehicle upon the public
highways of this state while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor.
19 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 257.625c(l)(a) (1967).
Any person who is afflicted with hemophilia, diabetes
or any condition requiring the use of an anticoagulant
under the direction of a physician shall not be deemed to
have given consent to the withdrawal of blood.
20 MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 257.625a(l) (1967).
Sec. 625a. (I) In any criminal prosecution for driving
a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
the amount of alcohol in such person's blood at the time
alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person's
blood, urine, breath or saliva, shall be admissible into
evidence and shall give rise to the following presump-
tions, and in the event any such tests are given,--the
results of such tests shall be made available to the person
so charged or his attorney upon written request to the
prosecution, with a copy of the request filed with the
court, and the prosecution shall furnish the report at least
2 days prior to the day of the trial and shall be offered as
evidence by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding;
failure to fully comply with such request shall bar the
admission of the results into evidence by the prose-
cution ....
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see the withdrawal of a blood sample. 21 A person charged with
intoxication who submits to a chemical test administered at the
request of a police officer must be informed that he will be given
the opportunity to have a person of his choosing administer one
of the chemical tests within a reasonable time after his deten-
tion. 22 A person charged with intoxication shall be informed that
he has the right "to demand that one of the tests provided
for... shall be given him... . "23 Although the general practice of
police officials is to charge the suspect with intoxication, the
question is raised whether these safeguards are available to a
person charged with impairment. Little reason exists for not ex-
plicitly providing the driver arrested for impairment with the same
safeguards.
The legislature has attempted to provide a statute which will
21 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a(2) (1967).
(2) Samples and specimens of urine, breath and saliva
shall be taken and collected in a reasonable manner; but
only a duly licensed physician, or a licensed nurse or
medical technician under the direction of a licensed phy-
sician and duly qualified to withdraw blood, acting in a
medical environment, at the request of a police officer,
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic content therein under the provisions of this act.
No liability for a crime or civil damages predicated on
the act of withdrawing blood and related procedures
attaches to a qualified person who withdraws blood or
assists in the withdrawal in accordance with this act
unless the withdrawal is performed in a negligent man-
ner.
22 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a(3) (1967).
(3) A person charged with driving a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor who takes a chemical
test administered at the request of a police officer as
provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) hereof, shall be in-
formed that he will be given a reasonable opportunity to
have a person of his own choosing administer one of the
chemical tests as provided in this section within a rea-
sonable time after his detention, and the results of such
test shall be admissible and shall be considered with
other competent evidence in determining the innocence
or guilt of the defendant.
23 Id.
Any person charged with driving a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor shall be informed that
he has the right to demand that one of the tests provided
for in paragraph (1) shall be given him, and the results of
such test shall be admissible and shall be considered with
other competent evidence in determining the innocence
or guilt of the defendant.
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enable the police to gather more easily evidence of a violation,
once the person has been arrested, without violating the person's
constitutional rights and without violating the individual's reason-
able sense of propriety and justice under the circumstances. The
state may need a greater evidence-gathering ability as to drunk
driving violators because of the difficulties of conviction. How-
ever, such need does not mean that the individual should, be
unduly subjected to unfair, harmful or distasteful experiences
with the police, prosecutor, Secretary of State, the Board or the
courts. To protect against this possibility, the act established the
following rights of the individual: the right to demand only a
breath test, to demand some test, to receive the results of the
tests, to be deemed to impliedly consent only if arrested for
intoxication or impairment, and even to refuse to take such tests
if the individual realizes the possible consequences of such refus-
al. The question remains, however, whether this statute, as writ-
ten, administered and interpreted, is the most efficacious means
of balancing these interests and whether its purpose-the gather-
ing of evidence-is the only feasible, or the most effective, ap-
proach to the drinking driving problem.
III. Problems with the Law
A. The Unconscious Person and Enforcement:
An Unnecessary Oversight
The act is peculiarly silent on the status of the unconscious
person. The drunken driver who passes out immediately after
arrest cannot be advised of his right to refuse to take chemical
tests or to demand only a breath test. Such a person will be
unable to take a breath test. The question arises whether a test
taken under such circumstances is admissible into evidence at an
intoxication or impairment trial. The test most likely to be given
is the blood test in the course of medical treatment. The statute,
however, explicitly recognizes that a blood test is dangerous for,
and should not be administered to, a hemophiliac, diabetic or a
person requiring the use of an anti-coagulent. Saliva and urine
tests, although not potentially dangerous, would be awkward to
administer to the unconscious driver. In the trial for intoxication
December 19691
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or impairment, however, a chemical test would be desirable to
prove that the driving behavior of the unconscious person was the
result of high blood alcohol levels and not of some other cause.
Such questions of police practice, evidentiary admissibility and
individual interests have long plagued the courts in criminal cases.
The legislature, in drafting the statute, went to great lengths to
balance individual rights against the need for evidence in the form
of chemical test results at trial. In the case of the unconscious
person, however, where the interest of the state in obtaining such
evidence and the need to protect the individual are especially
strong and conflicting, the legislature has left the vital balancing
decision to the courts. The courts should refuse to admit chemical
test evidence obtained from the unconscious person unless that
person consents to its admission at trial. This exclusionary rule is
based on the reasoning that the person was never given any
warnings and he never consented to the test. The legislature
should amend the statute to provide guidelines for the situation of
the unconscious person with the primary concern being the med-
ical care of the person. The amendment should provide that the
tests are to be taken only under the treating physician's care and
authorization, and only after meeting this requirement should they
be admitted into evidence. Under the present statute, if a test is
not taken of the unconscious person's blood alcohol content, such
person's inability to take the tests should not be deemed a refusal
for revocation preceedings under sections 625d and f.24
B. Tests Taken After the Fact: the Failure to Explicitly
Establish a Two-Test Rule
The presumptions outlined in the act for intoxication and im-
pairment refer specifically to results of tests which show blood
alcohol levels "at the time alleged"; 25 that is, at the time of the
suspected illegal operation. Chemical tests, however, can be tak-
en only after the suspect has been observed, arrested and taken to
a testing site, if necessary. As individuals vary tremendously in
their rates of absorption and oxidation of alcohol over time, the
important factor should be whether the test result is higher or
2 4 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625d, f (1967).
25 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a(I) (1967).
[Vol. 3:1I
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lower than the actual level at the time of operation of the motor
vehicle. This fact can be determined by taking two tests separated
by a fixed period of time, such as fifteen minutes. The prosecution
can be certain that the results of the tests do not reflect a blood
alcohol level which was below a presumption level at the time of
operation but above a presumption level at the time of the arrest
and test only if two tests are given. The two-test rule would
indicate whether the blood alcohol level was rising or falling.
Without two chemical tests over a period of time, any chemical
evidence obtained from a single test has only questionable
evidentiary significance.
Although section 625c(1) 26 states that the arrested person is
deemed to have given his consent to the chemical tests, section
625a(6) 27 states that, notwithstanding any other provisions of the
act, a person requested to take the chemical tests has the option
to demand that only a breath test be given. Unless the courts
interpret "a breath test" to mean that at least two separate sam-
ples of breath be taken over time, the implied consent law will be
of dubious value in gathering evidence for an intoxication or
impairment trial. In view of the necessity of taking two such tests,
the courts should weigh heavily the legislative intent to make the
gathering of objective evidence easier. The legislative intent to
prevent unnecessary harassment certainly should not be invoked
to protect the individual from administration of a valid test, which
necessarily requires the taking of at least two breath tests. Such a
decision in the construction of the statute, however, should not
have been left to the courts by the legislature. The legislature
should amend the statute to clarify the rule of taking two tests
over time.
The police have been instructed and are following the
evidentiary necessity of taking two tests over time.28 Certain
problems resulting from the failure of the legislature to specify a
two-test rule will arise when an individual takes the first breath
test but refuses to take the second. At the intoxication trial, the
evidence from the single test, even if admissible, should not form
the basis for the presumption levels. At the same time, the courts,
26 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625c(1) (1967).
27 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a(6) (1967).




upon review of revocation for refusal, should not allow refusal to
take the second test to serve as a justification for reversing revo-
cation.
C. The Person Willing to Take Chemical Tests
Other Than a Breath Test
Another problem of statutory interpretation will arise if the
arrested person refuses to take a breath test but is willing or
demands to take a saliva, urine or blood test. Police officers
presently consider such refusals a proper basis for initiating ad-
ministrative proceedings to revoke the driver's license for refusal
to take a test.2 9 Section 625c(1) states that the individual has
given his consent to tests of his blood, breath, urine or other
bodily substances.30 Section 625d states that if the individ-
ual refuses the request of the law enforcement officer to submit to
chemical tests, no test shall be given and the officer is to initiate
the administrative action to revoke the license of such person by
sending a sworn affidavit of the refusal to the Secretary of State's
office. 31 By appealing to the Board and through the circuit court,
persons who refuse the breath test will present to the courts the
difficult task of balancing the State's interest in coercing the
individual to take the test with the sanction of revocation for
refusal and the individual's right to be free from unpleasant
official harassment. If the person is willing to take other chemical
tests, he is willing to comply, substantially, with the purpose of
the law; that is, he is permitting the State to ascertain his blood
alcohol level by chemical testing. Although the state law contains
the explicit statement that the individual has impliedly consented
to tests of any of his bodily substances, the police agencies of the
state have gone to considerable expense to provide breath testing
facilities for all in order to comply with the statutory provision
that a breath test is sufficient to avoid revocation for refusal.
These agencies are not prepared to provide facilities for extensive
testing other than the breath test. This practical problem is accen-
tuated by the refusal of doctors to administer the tests, fearing
29 Id.
30Supra note 26.
31 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625d (1967). See note 5, supra.
[Vol. 3:1
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possible malpractice liability and loss of time due to court appear-
ances. The legislature has not made it clear that the refusal to
take a breath test but a willingness to take another chemical test
is a basis for revocation. The ambiguity should not be left to the
courts to resolve; instead the legislature should explicitly provide
for this situation.
The only guide for administrative and judicial review is
"[w]hether the person reasonably refused to submit to the test
upon the request of the officer." 32 This standard may be inter-
preted in a purely negative manner, the test to be whether the
refusal was made by a conscious, reasoning person as opposed to
an unconscious person. 33 Such an interpretation, however, might
do great injustice to certain individuals. The person afflicted with
emphysema may have very reasonably refused to take a breath
test to protect his health even though willing or demanding to take
some other test of his blood alcohol level. Those who would not
open the hearing to such affirmative factual issues of the reason-
ableness of refusal would revoke the emphysema victim's license
solely because he protected his own health by refusing to take a
breath test. This interpretation would in effect make the ability to
take a breath test safely a prerequisite to driving on the highways
of the state of Michigan. Such a view is neither a fair nor reason-
able interpretation of the legislative intent and purpose of the act.
Under the present statute, refusal based on a valid health reason,
even if not expressly recognized in the statute, and a good faith
desire to comply with other tests should require reversal of an
administrative revocation order.
The Michigan courts could go further and require that before
revocation would be permitted, the individual must refuse to
submit to any and all chemical tests. Such a reading of the act,
however, would be a judicial alteration of the balance which the
legislature attempted, no matter how inarticulately, to create be-
tween individual tastes and enforcement needs. Yet a Michigan
Circuit Court approached such a holding in Collins v. Secretary
32
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625f(2)(c) (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Act No. 253, § I
(1967).
33 Such a narrow interpretation should be tempered, however, in the definition of "refusal."
The New York Supreme Court ruled in Scott v. Kelley, 171 N.Y.S. 210, 5 A.2d 859
(1958), a case involving a man with false teeth who tried but failed to take the breath
test because his teeth prevented the proper exhalation, that such "failure" was not a
refusal. The New York Court distinguished inability from refusal.
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of State.3 4 In Collins, the arrested driver, on the advice of
an attorney, offered to submit to a blood test but refused to
take a breath test when requested to do so by the police. The
circuit court based its decision on two factors: first, the police are
not explicitly empowered under the statute to specify which test
should be administered; and second, the arrested person has the
right to demand that one of the tests be given him.3 5 The circuit
court held, therefore, that under the circumstances, the arrested
person's refusal to submit to the breath test was not unreasonable
and ordered the return of the driver's license. The case has been
appealed by the Secretary of State to the court of appeals and is
presently pending.36 Although such a construction can be made
from the ambiguities present in the statute, the result can
substantially frustrate the aim of the statute to gather chemical
test evidence through the least distasteful means possible-the
breath test. As the State presently lacks facilities for testing
saliva, and blood tests are not only expensive, but often impos-
sible to administer properly, no evidence can be obtained from
persons who refuse to take a breath test but who are willing, or
demand, to take only a blood or saliva test. If the holding of the
circuit court is affirmed by the higher courts, an arrested driver
need only demand a blood or saliva test, while refusing the breath
test, to avoid both chemical tests and revocation of license for
refusal to submit to a chemical test. Such a result would render
the present implied consent law nugatory.*
The courts cannot render such a ruling and comply with the
legislative intent of the statute. The legislature intended that
breath tests be the primary method of chemical testing, permitting
34 No. 3477 (Circuit Court, Washtenaw County, Mich. Oct. 17, 1968).
35 MICti. CoMP. LAWS § 257.625a(3) (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Act No. 253, § 1
(1967).
36 Docket No. 6627 (Mich. Ct. App., Oct. 2, 1969).
* [Ed. Note] The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court decision in
Collins while this article was in press. The court, while recognizing the ambiguities
present, placed much emphasis on the legislative intent. It held, inter alia, that
"Proper construction of the statute requires that subsections (3) and (6) be read so as
to give police officers the right to request an accused to take a particular chemical
test. An accused must: (1) take the test offered by police officers; (2) take a breath
test pursuant to subsection (6); or (3) risk revocation or suspension of his license."
Collins v. Secretary of State Docket No. 6627 (Mich. Ct. App., Oct. 2, 1969), 7.
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the individual the option to demand only a breath test.3 7 The
legislature also established the right of the individual to demand a
chemical test because the results of such tests could presump-
tively aid the defendant in gaining an acquittal on an intoxication
or impairment charge.38 The right of the arrested driver to de-
mand a test is independent of the right of the police to demand
that the driver take a test. Consent was deemed implied for all
chemical tests. The failure to provide for the refusal to take the
breath test for valid health reasons is no basis for permitting
every arrested driver to avoid revocation for refusal to take a
breath test if he is willing to comply with tests that the legislature
never really intended to be used. The courts should uphold the
legislative intent, even as the legislature should clarify the rights
of individuals who refuse to submit to a breath test for valid
health reasons.
D. Review of Revocation for Refusal
The membership of the Board, including local prosecutor and
sheriff, is hardly an inherently fair, unbiased body to review a
mandatory revocation order. The Board's very usefulness is ques-
tionable in light of the circuit court's ability to hear the case de
novo. Local prosecutors and police officers might better spend
their time prosecuting and apprehending rather than attempting to
act as a quasi-judicial body. The legislature perhaps recognized
the inherent bias of the Board in providing for a new trial on
review by the circuit court. Such a procedure for review is a
waste of time for either the Board or the circuit court. A more
efficient and more fair procedure would be to change the Board's
membership or eliminate it.a
9
If the present membership of the Board is maintained, consid-
erations of efficiency mandate either a tape recorded record of the
Board's hearing, or at least, a short written opinion by the chair-
37
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a(6) (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Act No. 253, § I
(1967).3 8
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a(3) (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Act No. 253,
3 8 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a(3) (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Act No. 253, § 1
(1967).
39 Fortunately, de novo review of license revocations for refusal to submit to chemical tests
has been statutorily limited to the same issues now heard by the Board. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 257.625f(3) (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Acts No. 335 (1968).
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man clarifying the reasons for action by the Board on the four
specific issues. Under such a system of recording, the circuit
courts might begin to appreciate or depreciate Board decisions for
rational, even legal, reasons, instead of blindly accepting either
the growth of administrative bureaucracy or the sympathy-
seeking pleas of the petitioner.40 In the first eight months of
1969, 3,101 persons refused to submit to chemical tests. 1,500 of
these appealed to the Board. 377 persons appealed the Board's
decisions to the circuit court.41 In view of the massive number of
possible appeals from revocation actions of all types, the neces-
sity of an administrative board effectively and fairly screening
most cases is clear.42 The addition of the revocation for refusal to
take chemical tests under the implied consent law to the jurisdic-
tion of the Board will hopefully lead to a revision of the proce-
dures and membership of the Board and the standard of review of
the courts.
The review by the Board and circuit court of revocations for
refusal is the place where the sanctions and impact of the im-
plied consent law may be increased, modified, diluted or
emasculated. 43 If the person who has refused to take the chemical
tests requests a hearing within the fourteen day time limit,44 the
Board must hold a hearing within thirty days of receipt of such
request. The hearing shall cover only the following issues: 45 (a)
the reasonableness of arrest, (b) the fact of arrest, (c) reason-
ableness of refusal, (d) and the proper advice of rights as set forth
in sections 625a, 625c, and 625d.46 One problem related to issues
(a) and (b) is the weight to be given an acquittal at the intoxication
or impairment trial on the "reasonableness" of the officer's belief
4 0 See, e.g., The Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, 1969 Public Acts No. 306.
41 Based upon an interview with Mr. John Foley of the Secretary of State's office,
September 19, 1969, on file at the PROSPECTUS office.
42 The slowness of the present appeal procedure is reflected by the fact that the Court of
Appeals did not decide the first case arising from the implied consent law until two
years after the law became operative.
43 Several examples of this activity have been discussed in previous sections. See the
discussion of the unconscious person, p. 8, supra; the two test rule, p. 9, supra; the
person willing to take chemical tests other than the breath test, pp. 10-12, supra.
4 4 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625e, f (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Act No. 335, § I
(1968).
45 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625f(2)(a)-(d) (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Act No. 335,
§ 1 (1968).




and the fact of arrest. The reasonableness of the officer's belief
should be judged solely on his own observations and not on tho
subsequent intoxication or impairment trial. The fact of arrest
should depend only on the reality of detention and charge based
upon probable cause at the time. The sanction imposed to force
compliance with the statute's purpose should not be affected by
the result of a trial, the result of which the person may have
altered by refusing to give the desired evidence. Acquittal at the
trial should not be the basis for restoration of the license when the
driver refused to take the test 4 7 To hold that the acquittal at the
intoxication trial makes the arrest illegal for purpose of revocation
can only be a show of judicial contempt for the implied consent
law, not a rational interpretation of its purposes and sanction.
One Michigan court has ruled, properly, in a three-judge court,
that dismissal of criminal charges for intoxication and impairment
is not binding on the Board in determining whether the officer's
belief was reasonable and the arrest valid.
48
The reasonableness of refusal (c) and tne advice of rights (d)
raise additional problems. If an individual is inebriated when
arrested, the police officer's mere reading of the individual's rights
may not be enough to permit such an individual to make a reason-
able decision. A drunken stupor is not the best frame of mind
in which to make a reasonable decision. Perhaps the arrested
person should have a lawyer to protect his rights, or at least a
sober understanding of his rights, to insure that any refusal be
"reasonable." In view of the number of intoxication and impair-
ment arrests and the need for tests taken near the time of sus-
pected illegal driving, furnishing counsel to all would pose an
insurmountable burden. Even in cases where the individual re-
fuses to take a test until a lawyer arrives, the delay caused by the
lawyer's arrival may render any subsequent tests taken virtually
useless in determining the arrested person's blood alcohol level at
the time of operation of his motor vehicle. This area of "reason-
able" refusal is logically difficult; but, practically, the reviewing
body, be it the Board, Circuit Court, Court of Appeals, or State
47 Another state's courts, under similar provisions, held that the acquittal at the in-
toxication trial makes the arrest illegal for purposes of revocation based on a refusal,
McDonald v. Ferguson, 129 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1964).
48 Conley v. Sec'y of State, Docket No. 103409 (Circuit Court, Wayne County, Mich.
Feb. 5, 1969), at 12.
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Supreme Court, may have to be satisfied with a minimally knowl-
edgeable refusal by the arrested driver upon a clear reading of his
rights by the police officer. If the individual is conscious and
acknowledges understanding, the police can do little more than
advise him of his rights. In view of the legislative concern for
protecting the individual from any test to which he does not wish
to submit, 49 the sanction of the implied consent law, revocation
for refusal, should be supported as much as possible, consonant
with the individual's right to be free from an unknowing accept-
ance of punishment.
Technical issues may arise in the warning of rights. Suppose
that a healthy individual is not apprised of the fact that if he has
hemophilia or is a heart patient being treated with anti-coagulants,
his consent is not deemed implied for blood tests. Suppose such
person refuses to take a breath test. The issue presented is wheth-
er such a person's refusal will result in revocation. Warning of the
rights that are germane to the person may be enough to comply
with (d), the legislative mandate that the driver be "advised of his
rights.... "50 The decision will depend on the extent to which the
reviewing body wishes to insure that all individuals are fully
advised of their rights and of the sanction available to the review-
ing body to force the police to adhere to such procedure. All
enforcement agencies plan to warn all individuals of the rights
explicitly given in the act. Yet the courts may add new rights,
such as for the emphysema victim, heart patient or the uncon-
scious driver. To insure that persons are warned of these new
rights, the reviewing court may reverse an otherwise valid revoca-
tion order, giving the individual who had refused for other reasons
the gift of a high judicial standard.
A final problem is the cost of the hearing by the Board and
review by the circuit court. In recognition of this cost, the legisla-
ture amended the statute to provide for hearing and review in the
place of arrest instead of the place of residence of the petitioner.
The amendment is really a recognition of the fact that the four
49 The person charged shall be advised that his refusal to take a test as herein provided
shall result in the suspension or revocation of his operator's or chauffeur's license or
his operating privilege.
5 0 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625f(2)(d) (1967), as amended Mich. Pub. Act No. 335, § 1
(1968).




issues to be considered in such hearings are not so narrow that
the officer's sworn statement that the arrested person refused to
take a chemical test is sufficient to resolve the controversy. As
suggested, the testimony of the arresting officer, the tester and
the arrested driver is frequently necessary to resolve the difficult
problems inherent in the four "narrow" issues. The State's hope
that refusal to submit to chemical tests would lead to summary
revocation without costly review has been dashed. In the first
eight months of 1969, 3,101 persons refused tests while 9,740
persons submitted to them.52 At the Board hearings, the arresting
officer often needs to appear. The simple revocation for refusal
can become almost as complicated as a trial for intoxication or
impairment.53 But that is the price the State must pay to enforce
the sanction of revocation for refusal under a statute which at-
tempts, all too awkwardly, to balance state and individual inter-
ests.
Ill. The Implementation of Breath Testing:
Cost Analysis Suggests A Possible Reform
A. The Implementation
Between July 12 and November 1, 1967, the enforcement
agencies of the State developed a system whereby any person
arrested in any part of the State for intoxication or impairment
had access to a breath-testing device. Such tests would have to be
sufficiently accurate to withstand evidentiary attacks at the in-
toxication or impairment trial. The Breathalyzer was chosen as
the device to be used in all breath tests. In light of the relative
accuracy and simplicity of the device, such a choice is com-
mendable.54 To meet possible attacks on the validity of breath
tests in general and specific tests in particular, the State had to
train technicians in the theory and practical operation of the
Breathalyzer. The State ordered 190 of these machines at a cost
52 See supra note 41.
53 To lower costs, provision could be made for the use of depositions to be administered by
the petitioner or his attorney before the Board hearing as substitute for the officer's
testimony at the Board hearing.
54 Watts, Some Observations on Police-Administered Tests for Intoxication, 45
N.C.L.REv. 56-58, 64-68 (1966).
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of $800 per machine. The machines were located throughout the
State so that a machine could be reached in fifteen minutes by car
from any point in the State. Each operator or tester takes the
breath sample, and the result appears immediately on the face of
the machine. The State Police set up a school for the training of
the uniformed officers of each police agency to serve as tech-
nicians capable of operating a testing device. The training school
consisted of a one-week course of intensive legal, theoretical and
practical training in the operation of the Breathalyzer and the
background necessary to testify knowledgeably at hearings or
trials. The State paid for the instruction while the local enforce-
ment agencies paid for the time of the trainees. Upon graduation
from this course, the trainee is certified and licensed as a valid
operator of the Breathalyzer. Matching federal funds of $500,000
were initially made available to set up this program. In the first
year, the "book" cost of the program totaled $441,419.
The State Police and local enforcement agencies attempt to
have five men trained for each machine under their jurisdiction.
All testers are uniformed police officers who must, at all times
while on duty, be available to administer the breath tests. Once
every three months or once every two hundred tests, whichever
occurs first, each operator and his machine is tested by dummy
samples supplied by the State. The testers testify at the in-
toxication or impairment trials as to the results of tests given, as
well as to their objectivity, correctness, and theoretical validity.
Such testimony often requires more than an afternoon in the
courtroom to await the call to testify and then to explain the
validity of the p:ocedure used in the specific test.
The arresting officer brings the arrested person to the test site
where the tester administers the test if the person does not refuse.
Depending upon the results of the test, the arrested person is
taken before a magistrate and is charged with the appropriate
offense. Unless the presumptive levels are reached in the test,
drunk driving charges are dropped. If no test is taken, charges
may be dropped unless the driving behavior and demeanor of the
driver which led to arrest were clearly "drunken." Under such a
procedure the magistrate serves no function other than to act as a
catalyst in dismissing drunken driving charges immediately if the
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presumptive levels are not reached. The immediacy of the test
result permits the prosecutor to drop charges at an early point.
B. The Problems
Under the existing program, the tester must make a subjective
reading of every test result as it appears on the face of the
machine and then appear in court to defend the result. Such a
procedure is not only open to prejudice on the part of the tester,
but is unnecessarily open to practical and theoretical evidentiary
attacks at trial. It would be fairer and cheaper for the legislature
to alter the rules of hearsay evidence for intoxication and impair-
ment trials to permit the sworn, written testimony of a removed,
objective analysis of the breath samples. To implement such a
system, the legislature must expressly recognize the theoretical
validity of the breath test and the accuracy of the Breathalyzer
instead of leaving this judgment to the vicissitudes of the court-
room. Provision should be made for a single, central analysis site.
Dr. Borkenstein, the inventor of the Breathalyzer, has developed
a small, portable capturing device for taking the breath sample.
This capturing device costs a fraction of the price of a Breath-
alyzer analysis machine. The samples taken by such capture
devices are collected in a small tube which could easily be ship-
ped to the central analysis site by mail. Such a system could be
implemented by purchasing a capture unit for each police car in
the state; the cost of such an enterprise would be less than the
purchase price of the 190 Breathalyzer machines. Each officer
could be trained to operate the capture unit in fifteen minutes.
Then only the arresting officer need appear at the intoxication or
impairment trial to testify to the driver's behavior, physical syn-
drome (breath smell, slurred speech, etc.), and, by a very mechan-
ical explanation, testify as to the manner of taking the sample.
The analysis center would send the results of the test to the
prosecuting attorney, the court, and the arrested driver by sworn
affidavit.
Such a system would delay the prosecutor in dropping or
reducing the drunk-driving charges until the results were made
available. Such a limitation, however, is relatively insignificant in
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view of the greater coverage, accuracy, and simplicity of the
suggested plan for administering the test, as well as the increased
efficiency of the revocation hearing and trial. More importantly,
such a system would free all uniformed police officers, presently
relegated to testing duties, for other police activities. This would
increase the manpower of the police force available for the execu-
tion of other responsibilities while reducing the actual cost of
breath-testing. Even though considerable expense has already
been incurred in the purchase of Breathalyzer machines and the
training of testers, little doubt exists that many police officials
would prefer to have the testers freed from their analysis and
testifying duties for more pressing enforcement responsibilities,
including the initial detection and arrest of persons suspected of
operating motor vehicles while under the influence of intoxicants.
A strong argument can be made that the admission of such
evidence under the proposed evidentiary procedure deprives the
defendant of his Constitutional right to confront witnesses. The
author would argue that the right does not extend to this proce-
dure. The state has explicitly recognized, as a matter of substan-
tive law, that Breathalyzer tests are valid if administered and
analyzed properly. The defendant has the right to question the
proper administration of the taking of a breath sample when the
arresting officer appears on the stand. The only right the defend-
ant may forego, then, is the right to question the procedure used
in analysis. Since the analysis procedure is by law carried out by
a trained technician unaware of the defendant's identity in the
normal course of that technician's business, the danger
of an improperly analyzed test is minimal. An analogy could
even be drawn to the common business records exception. Judi-
cial notice could be taken of the validity of the analysis proce-
dure. In any event, the danger to the defendant's rights under
such a procedure should be weighed against not only the state's
interest but the probability that the central analysis will be fairer
to the defendant, without confronting the analyst, than tests
analyzed under the present procedure, even with a confrontation
with the tester.
If the courts require the presence of the analyst in order to
satisfy the right to confrontation, the actual total cost of the
appearance of the analyst might be assessed against the defendant
if the defendant is subsequently convicted. Alternatively, the at-
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torney could be limited to confrontation by deposition of the
analyst. Either alternative would decrease the cost savings of
central analysis relative to the present test plan.
IV. The Implied Consent Law:
Call For a Supplementary Approach
The odds of apprehension for any moving violation are very
low indeed. One study suggested that only 1 in 7,600 persons ex-
ceeding speed limits by more than ten miles per hour were given
a citation. 55 The odds of apprehending the drunken driver may be
no better. The implied consent law does not alter the basic meth-
od of initially detecting the drunken driver. Yet, as a legislative
expression of increased concern over drunken driving, as a meth-
od of gaining evidence more readily once the initial contact is
made, and as a cause of huge expenditures and the marshalling of
police manpower for a specific duty, the implied consent law
should motivate patrolmen to increase the number of drivers
arrested and lead to an increase in drunk driving convictions. The
only available indicator of such an effect, mandatory suspensions
for convictions, supports this hypothesis. In 1966, 6,815 persons
had their licenses suspended upon conviction for impairment; in
1968, the number increased to 12,194.56 Surprisingly, of 9,740
tests administered in the first seven months of 1969, the results of
almost eighty per cent were 0.15% or more in blood alcohol level,
while the alcohol level was below 0.10% in less than four per cent
of those tests. 5 7 Apparently, officers are either especially adept in
deciding who should be arrested for drunk driving or they arrest
only those persons whose driving behavior is clearly suspicious.
Hopefully, the law's most important effect will be deterring the
public from driving after drinking by increasing the fear in a
potential drinking driver that he may be convicted for the offense
if apprehended. Such a fear is rational in view of the game of
Russian roulette which the implied consent law forces the ar-
rested person to play: either consent to a test which may pre-
sumptively prove guilt or face revocation of license for refusing to
take such test. This rational fear, however, is very slight if there is
55 A. LITTLE, THE STATE OF THE ART OF TRAFFIC SAFETY 245 (1966).




a low statistical probability of apprehension. Even if arrested, the
rational fear may be eliminated unless the courts protect the
state's interest in gathering evidence or the legislature moves to
clarify and simplify the existing law.
Under the present system, many drivers who are convicted of
drunk driving are not removed from the road upon revocation of
driving privileges and others persist in the dangerous drinking
driving behavior resulting in future violations and accidents.
Many researchers suggest that the drinking driver is often a
problem drinker who must be dealt with by other than criminal
sanctions if his dangerous driving behavior is to be deterred. 58
Other researchers suggest that drunken driving is a folk crime
which requires not stiffer criminal penalities, but sanctions and a
massive education effort which involve the violator's own social
environment in disapproval of the behavior.
59
Regardless of these theories of remedy, the rational fear of
some sanction can be increased by increasing the possibility that
any violator is likely to come into contact with some enforcement
agency or by increasing the potential violator's fear of apprehen-
sion by some enforcement agency. The transformation of the
present system of breath testing to portable capture units and a
central analysis site would have a direct effect. Yet aside from
such minor tinkerings with the system and an increase of the
highway patrols, the basic difficulty in increasing the number of
contacts with violators is the criminal law itself, the requirements
of probable cause before a person can be arrested, tested and a
further sanction imposed.
To alter this requirement, the contact must be removed from
the criminal law, if that is possible, and placed in a fair,
non-criminally punitive civil regulatory system. Under such a
system, the sanctions need be only bothersome or medically ori-
ented or designed to invoke the coercion of the violator's personal
friends and family. As a supplement to the existing criminal
sanctions, which are very severe, such sanctions could only add
to the fear of potential violators by permitting the increase of
58 See 'Prof. Cramton's review and suggestions, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions, 67





contacts with violators. An implied consent statute could be
drafted utilizing, for example, a system of compulsory testing
check lanes. Check lanes on randomly selected or dangerous
highways, perhaps at the outlets to roadside establishments, set
up by a civil agency with the authority to administer chemical
tests on penalty of revocation of license for refusal, could in-
crease the fear of apprehension of any drinking-driver.
The presumptive levels could be lowered to 0.05% in line with
evidence that the probability of accidents increases at that level
at least. 60 Such a lowering of presumptive levels might instill a
fear of detection and sanction in the less than heavy but still
statistically dangerous drinker who drives.
The development and administration of sanctions that courts
will be willing to classify as "non-criminal" poses a difficult prob-
lem. Certainly the sanction cannot include incarceration or the
assessment of fines. Medical treatment might be prescribed, and,
if desired, compliance could be coerced by the penalty of criminal
sanction for failure to accept treatment. The civil agency might be
empowered to take offending drivers home or to impound the
driver's car for safety. The nuisance and embarrassment of such
sanctions might prove sufficiently effective not to be labeled crim-
inal. Physical and psychological tests could perhaps be required
of offending drivers. The names of offending drivers could per-
haps be listed in the newspaper beside the names of those killed
in accidents during the year.
The civil agency should be empowered by the legislature to
develop such sanctions. The civil agency should publish rules
stating the sanctions to be used on persons of varying blood
alcohol levels. Persons stopped by the roadblock would be in-
formed that they may either take a breath test, which may result
in the imposition of specified sanctions, or refuse to take a breath
test, in which case revocation proceedings will be initiated. If the
person refuses, the agent files a sworn affidavit with the Secretary
of State testifying to such refusal. The procedure used to review
revocations for refusal under the existing implied consent law
would then be followed, except the only issues for review would
be the reasonableness of refusal and the warning of "right". If the
60 See, e.g., BORKENSTEIN, supra note I.
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person takes the test, sanctions promulgated by the agency can be
invoked, depending on the results. The results of such agency
tests, however, are not admissible in evidence at an impairment or
intoxication trial. Immunity from impairment or intoxication con-
viction for that contact would be established by the statute. The
statute should also provide that contacts outside of the regular
course of a general testing check point shall not lead to the
imposition of any civil or criminal sanctions. This "regular
course" requirement is designed to prevent random and dis-
criminatory enforcement.
Records could be kept of the violators in each system, criminal
and civil, comparing them in order to determine which set of
sanctions had the greatest effect on the subsequent drinking driv-
ing behavior of those apprehended. The sanctions imposed in the
civil system could be varied and changed every year, thereby
permitting a determination of which civil sanctions most
effectively reform drinking drivers. In each system the violators
with drinking problems could be isolated as they are appre-
hended, and, hopefully, treated medically where the rational fear
of sanctions has no effect. Such a dual system of detection would
hopefully deter more potential violators from driving after drink-
ing.
V. Conclusion
The implied consent law, as enacted in MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 257.625 is no panacea for the havoc which drinking drivers
wreak on this nation's highways. The law is a tool which can aid
the police in gaining evidence of drinking driving. Problems arise
in the legislature's attempt to balance state and individual inter-
ests properly, the failure to lower presumptive levels for guilt, the
failure to utilize portable capture units in conjunction with an
altered law of evidence at intoxication and impairment trials, and
the limited vision in apprehending and dealing with drinking driv-
ers. The following reforms, therefore, should be made:
I. To balance properly state and individual interests, the indi-
vidual shall impliedly give his consent to chemical tests of his
bodily substances and have the right to demand that the police
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administer only a breath "test" (to consist of taking two samples
over time); he shall be afforded an opportunity, after taking such
test, to have an independent test made; and the results of such
tests shall be furnished him or his attorney. The individual
suffering some physical ailment rendering the administration of
the breath tests potentially dangerous shall have the right to
demand that another chemical test be given him, the type of test
to be decided at the discretion of the police officer. Such tests
shall be given in a reasonable manner and, if a blood test, the test
is to be supervised by a medical doctor in a medical environment.
The unconscious person, because he cannot be properly advised
of his rights, may be given a test only by a medical doctor, in the
discretion of such doctor, if the unconscious person's condition
permits. The unconscious person's failure to take such tests shall
not be deemed a refusal for purposes of revocation. The police
shall have the right to demand that an arrested driver submit to a
breath test, consisting of two breath tests over time, and refusal to
submit to such breath tests shall be the basis for revocation,
unless the individual is unconscious or refuses for reasons of
health. The refusal of the person, having health reasons for refus-
al to submit to a breath test, to submit to other chemical tests
shall be deemed a refusal for purposes of revocation.
The thrust of these statutory reforms is to balance clearly state
and individual interests at a single point: the taking of a breath
test, consisting of two samples taken over time.
II. To insure the conviction of drivers who are impaired by the
consumption of alcohol, the presumption for impairment shall be
0.08%
lI. To insure adequate, fair and expeditious review of revo-
cation for refusal, the Board shall consist of three persons ap-
pointed by the Secretary of State. The Board shall follow the
procedures outlined by the 1969 Administrative Procedures
Act,6 1 including the keeping of a record and the writing of an
opinion by the Board. Review by the Circuit Courts shall be a
review, not a de novo trial. The Board's decision shall be reversed
only if the decision violates state or federal constitutions, is an
abuse of discretion, is made without jurisdiction, is not supported
by substantial evidence on the whole record, or is contrary to law.
61 See note 40 supra.
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The Board's hearing and judicial review shall be limited to the
issues of whether the person was arrested and the reasonable
belief of the police officer, whether the person was notified of his
rights under the implied consent law, and whether the refusal was
reasonable.
IV. To insure a fair and expeditious trial, and to gather and
present evidence as fairly and easily as possible, portable capture
units shall be used by the arresting officer. Samples of breath shall
be taken by the local officer and shipped to a central analysis site.
The analysis report shall be admitted in evidence without ques-
tion of its reliability and validity. Only the arresting officer and
the person who took the breath sample from the arrested driver,
presumably the same person in most circumstances, need testify
at trial as to the procedure used in taking the breath sample.
V. To increase the fear of apprehension, even in drivers who
do not drink to the extent that blood alcohol levels reach 0.08%, a
civil regulatory system shall be established, with an implied con-
sent law, to administer breath tests. Capture units may be set up
at any point in the State on a public highway to detain persons for
breath-testing. The presumptive level for the imposition of a
non-criminal sanction or treatment shall be 0.05%. The same
rights and duties outlined for the intoxication-impairment implied
consent, outlined above, shall apply to the individual except that
arrest, probable cause and reasonable belief are inapplicable. Re-
view of revocation for refusal shall be the same as outlined above.
A person apprehended and tested by the civil regulatory authority
shall be immune from prosecution for that violation under the
intoxication-impairment laws.
These reforms would lead to the strengthening of the present
implied consent law, while protecting individual rights, in addition
to the institution of a new system of detection, sanction and
treatment of the drinking driver. The civil regulatory system has
the potential for abuse, but it also has the potential to place the
problem of drinking driving and traffic safety into a new context
which, as a supplementary approach, can greatly aid in deterring
drivers from drinking and drinkers from driving. The reforms in
the present implied consent law can serve to eliminate the
difficulties of the present statute and the cumbersome adminis-
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tration of testing, thereby eliminating the opportunity which law-
yers, police, and courts presently have to rewrite and possibly
vitiate the implied consent law.
